What does prompt injection vulnerability actually look like in practice when someone uses a chatbot on a public website?
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Fan-out diagram
The searches the AI actually ran for this prompt.
SEED QUERY
What does prompt injection vulnerability actually look like in practice when someone uses a chatbot on a public website?
1 real search · 1 real-search pass
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications prompt injection indirect prompt injection excessive agency sensitive information disclosureGoogle ↗
OBSERVEDInstruction
Badge and edge weight = share of passes that produced the query. Hover a query for its intent and routing format.
Query classes
Google's semantic query class for every sub-query: what kind of answer each search is after, simulated vs real.
ChatGPT real searches (1)
Classes come from the query-classifier (a local Laya model). 1 of 1 calls are low-confidence (under 50%) — hover a query in the table to see its confidence.
Searches and sources
ChatGPT1 real searches · gpt-6
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications prompt injection indirect prompt injection excessive agency sensitive information disclosure Google ↗
- OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications v1.0.1 · owasp.org
- owasp.github.io · owasp.github.io
- LLM Prompt Injection Prevention · cheatsheetseries.owasp.org
- AI/LLM Application Security Testing and Red Teaming · owasp.github.io